Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

5-1-2014

Anwar al-Aulaqi: Targeted Killings, Emergency
Executive Powers, And The Principle Of
Proportionality
Charles John Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Smith, Charles John, "Anwar al-Aulaqi: Targeted Killings, Emergency Executive Powers, And The Principle Of Proportionality"
(2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 580.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/580

ANwAR AL-AULAQI: TARGETED KILLINGS, EMERGENCY EXECUTIVE POWERS,
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
INTRODUCTION

Between 2002 and 2009, the United States is believed to have conducted over 50 predator
drone strikes between Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. 1 Since January 2009, that number has
increased to a total of over 300 strikes. 2 The drone strikes reached their peak in 2010, with 121
confirmed strikes, 117 of which took place in Pakistan. 3 The escalation in the number of drone
strikes throughout the Middle East has been part of a concerted effort, beginning with the Bush
Administration and intensified under the Obama Administration, to target members of al-Qaeda,
al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and other terrorist groups included in the broader
war against terrorism. However, with the increase in attacks emanating from Yemen, the Obama
administration has begun shifting its focus to the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, the strikes in
Yemen have so far outnumbered those in Pakistan for the first time in 2012. 4
Although President Obama inherited the drone program, because of the increasing
frequency of strikes, his administration has become synonymous with the practice. Beginning in
2010, the Administration took steps to create a targeted kill list, a process described as a
"disposition matrix". 5 The "disposition matrix" begins with the compiling of the names of
operatives as well as the building of rosters of terrorist organizations and their affiliates. 6 This
task is left to certain government agencies, among them the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
1

Striking AI Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.comiinteractive/2012/05/29/worldlmiddleeast!striking-al-qaeda.html?ref'oworld; Tracking
America's drone war, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2012), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/foreignldrones/#.
2
Striking AI Qaeda, N.Y. Times (May 29, 2012), available at
"''http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/29/worldlmiddleeast!striking-al-qaeda.html?reFworld.

'!d.
4

Greg Miller, Plan for hunting terrorists signals US. Intends to keep adding names to kills lists, WASH. POST (Oct.
23, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldlnational-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signalsus-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/20 1211 0/23/4789b2ae- I 8b3-11 e2-a5 5c-39408fbe6a4b_ story.html.
5
Id.
6
Id

The Department of Defense (DOD), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC). 7 Once compiled, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
makes a list based on specific White House criteria and forwards the list to Deputies committee
of the National Security Council. 8 The committee then culls the list to individuals who will be
targeted. 9 As the fmal step in the process, President Obama signs off on individuals who will be
placed on the targeted capture/killlist. 10
In 2010, the Obama administration took the unprecedented step of placing Anwar alAulaqi, a U.S. citizen, on the targeted killlist. 11 Mr. al-Aulaqi was born in New Mexico in 1971,
and served as an imam in California and Virginia. 12 Following his release from a Yemeni prison
in 2007, Mr. al-Aulaqi became perhaps the most influential English-speaking advocate of violent
jihad against the United States. While Mr. al-Aulaqi had never been accused of carrying out
terrorist attacks personally, American authorities believe that he was the main inspiration for
Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist accused of shooting thirteen people at Fort
Hood, Texas, in November 2009, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who failed to blow up an
airplane with a bomb hidden in his underwear in December 2009. 13 In addition, Paisa! Shahzad,
the man who attempted to set off a car bomb in Times Square in May 2010, cited al-Aulaqi as an
inspiration. 14 Counterterrorism officials have claimed that these examples show that Mr. a!-

Id.
Id.
9
Id.
1o Id.
n Joe Becker & Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test oJObama's Principles, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/worldlobamas-leadersbip-in-war-on-al-

7
8

qaeda.html?pagewanted~all.
12

Scott Shane & Souad Mekhennet, Imam's Path From Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad (May 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/world/09awlaki.html?ref=anwaralawlaki.
13
Id.; See also Dana Priest, U.S. military teams, intelligence deeply involved in aiding Yemen on strikes, WASH.
POST (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdynlcontent/article/20 I 0/01/26/AR20 I 0012604239_pf.html.
14
Shane & Mekhennet, supra note II.

Aulaqi had evolved from being merely a propagandist into playing an operational role m
AQAP's efforts to carry out terrorist attacks. 15
In response to media reports that Mr. al-Aulaqi had been placed on a kill list Nasser a!Aulaqi, Mr. al-Aulaqi's father, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 16 The suit claimed that Mr. al-Aulaqi's placement on a kill list violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, Fifth Amendment right not to be
deprived of life without due process, in addition to stating a claim under the Alien Tort Statute
for a violation of international law. 17 On December 7, 2010, the complaint was dismissed on
standing grounds. 18 However, the District Court judge further stated that the case potentially
presented a non-justiciable political question. 19
Mr. al-Aulaqi and his associate Samir Khan, also a U.S. Citizen, were killed by a predator

drone strike on September 30, 2011. 20 Less than a month later, Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, Mr. a!Aulaqi's son and a U.S. citizen born in Colorado, was killed by a separate predator drone
strike?' While the Obama Administration claims that Mr. al-Aulaqi had taken on an operational
role in AQAP, there has been no evidence provided to show that Mr. Khan had taken on a similar
role within the organization. According to information in the public domain, the extent of Mr.

15

Becker & Shane, supra note 10.
Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp.2d I (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No.
1:10-cv-01469).
17
Id.at9-10.
18
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d I, 14-35 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
19
See id. at 44-52.
20
Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30,
2011 }, available at http://www .nytimes.com/20 11110/0 1/world/midd1eeastlanwar-al-aw1ak:i-is-killed-inyemen.html?ref=middleeast.
21
Charlie Savage, Relatives Sue Officials Over U.S. Citizens Killed by Drone Strikes in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (July 18,
20 12), available at http://www .nytirnes.com/20 12/07/19/world/middleeastlus-officials-sued-over-citizens-killed-inyemen.htm1; See also Peter Finn & Greg Miller, Anwar ai-Awlaki 's family speaks out against his son's death in
airstrike, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2011 ), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wor1d/national-security/anwaral-awlak:is-family-speaks-out-against-his-sons-deaths/20 11/10/17/glQA8kFssL_story.html.
16

Khan's involvement was limited to his being editor of Inspire, AQAP's English-language
magazine. 22
Even more troubling is the killing of Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi. The al-Aulaqi family has
claimed that Abdulrahman had left the family home in Sana'a, Yemen, in order to look for his
father, when he was killed. 23 News reports, based on government sources, had originally claimed
that the younger al-Aulaqi was in his early twenties and an AQAP militant. 24 In response to these
reports the al-Aulaqi family released Abdulrahman's official birth certificate from the State of
Colorado showing that he was sixteen years of age.Z5 Because the executive program is shrouded
in secrecy there is no way to tell whether Abdulrahrnan al-Aulaqi was targeted or whether he was
"collateral damage."
On July 18, 2012, Mr. al-Aulaki's father again filed suit, this time on behalf of his son

and grandson, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 26 While the new complaint
replaced the ATS claim with a violation of the Bill of Attainder clause, the main thrust of the
plaintiffs argument remained: The placing of an American Citizen on a targeted kill list and his
subsequent killing violates the Constitution.27
The current regime is one in which the Executive Branch, and the President specifically,
is determining which individuals are being placed on the kill list and targeted without any
oversight from the co-equal branches or the possibility of judicial review prior to a strike
directed at an American citizen. The constitutional implications of such a state of affairs is
22

Mazzetti, Schmitt & Worth, supra note 19.
Peter Finn & Greg Miller, Anwar al-Awlaki's family speaks out against his son's death in airstrike, WASH. POST
(Oct. 27, 2011) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/natiooal-security/anwar-al-awlakis-familyspeaks-out-against-his-sons-deaths/20 11/10/17/giQA8kFssL_story.httnl.
24
Glenn Greenwald, The killing ofAwlaki's 16-year-old-son, SALON.COM (Oct. 20, 2011) available at
http://www.salon.com/2011/10/20/the_killing_of_awlakis_16_year_old_son!.
25
Abdulrahman al-Awlaki's birth certificate, WASH. POST (last visited Dec. 7, 2012) available at
http://www. washiogtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/abdulrahman-al-awlaki-birth-certificate.html.
26
Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.C. Cir. 2012).
27
ld. at I.
23

troubling: whether the Executive has the authority to operate such a program free from judicial
oversight and, if not, whether the "disposition matrix" can withstand Constitutional review. As
stated in a New York Times editorial piece following the disclosure of the kill list: "It is too easy
to say that this is a natural power of a commander in chief. The United States cannot be in a
perpetual war on terror that allows lethal force against anyone, anywhere, for any perceived
threat. " 28
Part I of this article will briefly describe the legal status of targeted killings. The practice
of targeted killings is a relatively recent development in both domestic and international law. Its
legality is hotly contested both as a matter of American constitutional law and international
humanitarian law. Although the Obama administration has attempted to justizy the practice under
both legal frameworks, its legality remains unclear?9
Part II of this article will review the history of presidential powers during an emergency
and will address the issue of the extension of the authority to target and kill American citizens to
the Executive branch and whether it can be justified under an emergency powers doctrine.
Because Israel and the United Kingdom have an extensive history of cases dealing with terrorism
and numerous legislative acts concerning emergency powers, they will be the contrast to
American jurisprudence concerning emergency powers in the struggle against terrorism.
Part III will address whether the principle of proportionality may be better suited to assist
in judicial review with regard to the targeted killing of American citizens who take up arms with
a non-state actor against the U.S. Because the citizen's right not to be deprived oflife absent due
process represents a significant and fundamental right it is unclear whether the District Court will
28

Editorial, Too Much Power for a President, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2012), available at
http://www .nytimes.com/20 12/05/31/opinion/too-much-power-for-a-president.html.
29
Micah Zenko, How the Obama Administration Justifies Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July
5, 2012), available at https://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/05/bow-the-obama-Administration-justifies-targetedkillings/.

once again be able to dismiss the suit on standing. While the Supreme Court has commonly
deferred to the foreign policy decisions of the Executive there are significant and troubling
constitutional implications involved in the targeting and killing of American citizens absent due
process.
The purpose of this paper is to show that, because of the limits on Executive power in the
war on terror, and because the right at issue is a fundamental right, the United States Supreme
Court will most likely be unable to uphold the Executive's authority to unilaterally place a U.S.
citizen on a targeted kill list under a due process balancing or strict scrutiny test and would be
better served by applying the principle of proportionality to terrorism cases going forward.

I.

The Legal Status of Targeted Killing
In defending the predator drone program members of the Obama administration have

consistently referred to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). 30 Taken at face
value, the AUMF would appear to support the conclusion that the drone program is, as an
exercise of Executive authority, legal. 31 When the President acts with either explicit or implied
authority from Congress, his power is at its maximum.32

30

Authorization for the Use of Military Force, S.J. Res.23, 107th Cong. (I" Sess. 2001); See Harold Koh, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The
Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010); Jeh Johnson, General Counsel, U.S. Dept. ofDef.,
Speech at Yale Law School: National security law, lawyers and lawyering in the Obama Administration (February
22, 2012); John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrurism, Remarks at the
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism
Strategy (April30, 2012).
31
See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635-637 ("When the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate ... A seizure executed by the President pursuant to
an act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude ofjudicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.").
32
See id.

The Obama administration has steadily defended their practice of targeted killing under a
liberal definition of "imminent" as understood in intemationallaw. 33 Traditionally, the concept
of imminent has been defined as "instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment of deliberation." 34 However, the administration has argued that the geographic
distinction limiting strikes to "hot" battlefields is inapposite when dealing with the terrorist
threat. 35 Despite these protestations, the idea that the use of lethal force is not limited to "hot"
battlefields is far from universally accepted. 36
The international law concept of anticipatory self-defense also requires that the response
to an imminent threat be both necessary and proportionate. Congress ought to have been
presumed to know this when they inserted the "necessary and appropriate" language into the
AUMF. Given the traditional understanding of imminent, there is nothing to suggest that those
targeted far from a hot battlefield constitute such a threat or that a drone strike is necessary and
appropriate. Furthermore, the language of the AUMF does not seem to cover military action in
Yemen or against individuals who are a part of AQAP. 37
Assuming arguendo that the exigencies of the situation reqnire lethal action, there are still
domestic law implications. In the limited public comments made by individuals the

33
Koh, supra note 24 ("Of course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will
depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat..."); See
also John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard
Law School (September 16, 2011) ("Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners
have begun to recognize that the traditional concept of what constitutes an "imminent" attack should be broadened
in light of the modem day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations ofterrorist o~anizations.").
34
MARK W. JANIS & JOliN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 545 (3 ed. 2006).
35
Brennan, supra note 27 ("The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa' ida as
being restricted solely to 'hot' battlefields."); Johnson supra note 24 ("Third: there is nothing in the wording of the
2001 AUMF or its legislative history that restricts this statutory authority to the "hot" battlefields of Afghanistan.").
36
See Brennan, supra note 28 ("Others in the international connnunity - including some of our closest allies and
~artners- take a different view of the geographic scope of the conflict, limiting it only to the hot battlefields.").
7
The language of the AUMF allows the president to use necessary and appropriate force against, "those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, connnitted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons". Not only was Yemen not involved in the
September 11"' attacks, but AQAP as an organization was not conceived until January, 2009.

7

Administration has superficially addressed what they argue is the process due an American
Citizen who might be targeted. Without admitting the existence of a program, Attorney General
Eric Holder has laid out the legal justification for targeting a citizen:
Let me be clear: an operation using lethal force in a foreign
country, targeted against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational
leader of al Qaeda or associated forces, and who is actively
engaged in planning to kill Americans, would be lawful at least in
the following circumstances: First, the U.S. government has
determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual
poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United
States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation
would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of
· . I es. 38
war pnnc1p
He further concluded that the Constitution does not require the President to wait to strike until a
theoretical end-stage of planning, and that such a delay could put American lives at jeopardy.39
Because of the nature of terrorism, such arguments have gained considerable traction within the
international community. However, the Attorney General would go on to conclude that the
Constitution guarantees "due process, not judicial process."40
In a secret legal memorandum written by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal

Counsel government lawyers provided the justification for acting despite an Executive order
banning assassinations, a federal law against murder, various aspects of the international laws of
war, and the protections in the Bill of Rights, specifically the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 41
The memo was narrowly drawn to the specifics of Mr. Au1aqi's case and concluded that what is
considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and what process was due under the Fifth

38

Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the Northwestern University School of Law (March 5, 2012).
!d.
Id.
41
Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2011), available at
'http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/1 0/09/worldlmiddleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a39
40

(;itizen.html?pagewanted~1&reF=world

Amendment was different for al-Aulaqi than an ordinary criminal. 42 As support for this
contention, the memo cited Supreme Court cases allowing for the detention and prosecution of
American citizens who have joined an enemy's forces. 43 In addition, the memo argues that it
would be constitutional to take lethal action in order to curtail an innninent threat to innocent
people and that the threat could be imminent even where the enemy leader is not in the midst of
launching an attack. 44
Because the only evidence of the Administration's legal reasoning is public statements
made by administration officials it is unclear how strong their justifications are. The liberal
definition of imminent that they apply does not have widespread acceptance within the
international community. Moreover, it is unclear whether the AUMF would cover military action
in Yemen or ifAQAP is covered under the resolution. If not, the President might be able to rely
on his Commander in Chief powers alone. 45 However, these justifications fail to sufficiently
address the deprivation of the due process rights involved in the targeting of American citizens.
Most troubling is Attorney General Holder's conclusion that citizens are entitled to "due process,
not judicial process." Given the most recent Supreme Court cases concerning terrorism this
assumption is not especially strong.

II.

Emergency Powers and Combatting Terrorism - The United States, United
Kingdom, and the State of Israel
A. The United States
1. The Civil War and Habeas Corpus

Id.
!d.
44 !d.
45
See John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Failure 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673, 1673-74, (19992000) (In 1998, President Clinton used cruise missiles to target suspected terrorists in Sudan and Afghanistan
without Congressional approval.).
42

43

0

The United States Constitution is relatively ambiguous in its delegation of emergency
powers. The sole reference to the authority to take action during an emergency can be found in
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, also known as the Suspension Clause: "The privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it." 46 The power to suspend the writ is clearly delegated to Congress,
being found in Article I, and by the text of the Clause the only explicit cases of emergency where
the writ can be suspended are in cases of rebellion or invasion. The Constitution does not express
what other circumstances, beyond rebellion or invasion, may be defined as an emergency nor
does it specify who, or what, determines the extent or duration of an emergency.
The writ has only been suspended four times in American history: during the Civil War;
during Reconstruction; following the Spanish-American War in the Philippines; and in Hawaii
following the attack on Pearl Harbor. 47 Of the occasions where the writ has been suspended, the
former three fall squarely within the rebellion framework while the latter would qualify as an
invasion. In this respect all four would qualify as emergencies anticipated by the Framers.
The most controversial of the suspensions of the writ would certainly be Lincoln's
suspension of the writ during the Civil War. By its placement in Article 1, the authority to
suspend is clearly granted to the Legislative branch. However, at the onset of the Civil War
President Lincoln did so in the military distract that encompassed Washington D.C. without prior
legislative authorization. 48 It can hardly be argued that the circumstances Lincoln faced did not
amount to a rebellion. Insurrection in Maryland had threatened to isolate the Capital from the rest
of the Union and Lincoln authorized his military commanders to suspend habeas corpus if

.,;

.. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
Jonathan Shaw, The War and the Writ: Habeas Corpus and security in an age ofterrorism, HARvARD MAGAZINE
(Jan.-Feb. 2009), available at http:/lharvardmagazine.com/2009/01/the-war-the-wtit?page=all.
41

•• Id.

1ll

necessary. 49 When the writ was suspended not only was the stage set for the first Constitutional
battle over the Suspension Clause, but also the President faced the first significant challenge to
his power during an emergency in American history.
In Ex Parte Merryman, 5° Chief Justice Roger Taney, acting in his capacity as a circuit court
judge for the District of Maryland, was asked to determine whether Lincoln had the authority
suspend the writ. In a scathing rebuke to the President's actions, Chief Justice Taney opinion
stated that:

These great and fundamental laws, which congress itself could not
suspend, have been disregarded and suspended, like the writ of
habeas corpus, by a military order, supported by force of arms.
Such is the case now before me, and I can only say that if the
authority which the constitution has confided to the judiciary
department and judicial officers, may thus, upon any pretext or
under any circumstances, be usurped by the military power, at its
discretion, the people of the United States are no longer living
under a government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty
and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose
military district he may happen to be found. 51
Despite the clear ruling that his actions had been deemed unconstitutional, the president
disregarded the order and opined: "Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" 52 President Licoln would go on to
suspend the writ a number of times during the Civil War, with the battle between the Judiciary
and the Executive becoming moot with the passage of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act in
March 1863Y

., Id.
50

17 F. Cas 144 (C.C.D. Md 1861).

51

ld. at 152.

52

JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE PRESIDENT'S WAR
POWERS, at 197 (2006).

53

Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, Chap. LXXXI, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).

11

2. World War II, Korematsu, and Youngstown Steel
The era of the Second World War represented a dramatic shift in the willingness of the
Court to approve of Executive action during wartime. Supreme Court decisions in Ex parte
Quirin 54 and Johnson v. Eisentrager55 offered a significantly more expansive view of Executive

powers during wartime than its Civil War predecessors. However, whereas the decisions in
Quirin and Eisentrager dealt with non-citizens who had taken up arms against the United States,

the Court's decision in Korematsu came to represent the approval of the Executive exercise of
power over American citizens during times of war.
The Korematsu case dealt with the Executive's authority to issue an order providing for
the internment of Japanese Americans on the west coast of the United States during the war. 56
Korematsu challenged his detention as a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Despite the equal protection challenge the Court's decision rested not
on the constitutional validity of the racial classification but on the authority of the President
during war:

Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of
hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war
with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens
of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast
temporarily, and, fmally, because Congress, reposing its
confidence in this time of war in our military leaders - as
inevitably it must - determined that they should have the power
to do just this. 57
54

317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (holding that the President bas the authority to try "unlawful combatants" by military
tribunal and declining habeas review).
55
339 U.S. 763, 790-91 (holding that U.S. conrts had no jurisdiction over German prisoners being held in a U.S.
administered prison in Germany).
56
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
57
!d. at 223; See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).

,,.,

While Korematsu has historically been excoriated due to its racist underpinnings, it was the
embrace of the idea that the Executive has significantly greater powers to limit certain
fundamental rights of citizenship during times of war which had a lasting effect
Because Congress had acquiesed in the President's decision to detain Japanese
Americans in internment camps in Korematsu, the Supreme Court had no occasion to question
the President's authority to act contrary to Congressional wishes. This determination would
come before the Court during the Korean War in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 58 In
an attempt to prevent a nationwide strike, which he beleved would jeopardize national security,
President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate the country's steel
mills. The Court eventually held that the President did not have the inherent authority to seize the
mills and in doing so had acted contrary to Congressional intent. 59 The decision in Youngstown
represented only a mild departure from the Supreme Court's deference to Executive decisions
during wartime. However, this departure from unlimited Executive powers during times of war
would have significant implications nearly half a century later.

3. The Global War on Terror
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration
implemented a program of indefinite detention of both American citizens and non-citizens
suspected of terrorism. 60 The majority of these 'detainees" were held at the American military
prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This was a concerted attempt by the administration to
58

343 U.S. 579 (1952).

59

Id. at 588-89.

60

Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012) (In 2002, the Bush Administration made a sweeping declaration that the
majority of the detainees were "unlawful combatants" and thus were not protected by the Geneva Convention. A
special detention facility was set up at the American Naval Base in Guantanamo, the reasoning being that the
Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager would withdraw them from the reach of the judiciary. In addition
to those detained at Guantanamo, a smaller group of "high value" detainees were held in secret prisons scattered
around the globe by the Central Intelligence Agency).

1~

withdraw federal habeas jurisdiction to review Executive detention from the courts. 61 However,
from 2004-2008, in a series of narrow, technical decisions, concerning both Executive and
legislative attempts to withdraw habeas jurisdiction, the Supreme Court rejected the
administration's "unitary Executive" theory and the broad presidential powers commensurate
with it.
Beginning with Rasul v. Bush, 62 the Supreme Court took a number of steps to
significantly limit the Executive's authority to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely and beyond
the reach of judicial review. In Rasul, the Government, basing their contentions on Eisentrager,
argued that the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions of aliens being detained
abroad. 63 In fact, the choice of Guantanamo was an explicit attempt to place the detainees
beyond the reach of the judiciary.64 However, the Supreme Court held that although the United
States lacked ultimate seovereignty that they did exercise "exclusive jurisdiction and control". 65
Based on this determination the Court rejected the Adminstration's reasoning and found that the
judiciary had jurisdiction to hear habeas reviews of those detained at Guantanamo. 66
In response to the Court's ruling in Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 (DTA). 67 The bulk of the Act seeked to remedy many of the abuses which had taken
place at Guantanamo since its inception as a prison for detainees. However, in response to the
Court's decision regarding the process due those individulas held at Guantanamo, tbe DTA also
61

See Brief for the Respondents at 14-50, Rasnl v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03,343).
542 u.s. 446 (2004).
63
Brief For the Respondents, supra note 51, at 14-50.
64
See Cullen Murphy, Todd S. Purdum, David Rose, Philippe Sands, Guantanamo: An Oral History, VANITY FAIR
(January 11, 2012), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/0l/guantanamo-bay-oral-history-201201
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outset that Guantanamo was outside American legal jurisdiction, and that, in essence, its personnel could treat
detainees as they wished.").
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established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) to determine the status of those being
detained. 68 While the Act did provide for appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, it nonetheless stripped the judiciary of original jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions.
Not surprisingly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld/9 the Court rejected this attempt, through the
DTA, to withdraw detainees from the reach of the courts and found that the president lacked the
authority to establish the tribunals. Furthermore, it found that the military commissions
established by the Bush admiuistration shortly after the September 11th attacks violated both the
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Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Third Geneva Convention. 7 Following the
Court's decision in Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of2006 (MCA). 71
The main purpose of the MCA was to establish the procedures for trying detainees by military
commissions valid under the UCMJ and Geneva Conventions. 72 However, it also attempted to
strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of those being detained not only at
Guantanamo but also eliminated habeas jurisdiction for any alien, wherever seized or held, so
long as they have been, "determined by the Uuited States to have been properly detained as an
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination."73

68

Id. at§ 1405 (The section of the Act establishing the CSRTs explicitly attempted to remove habeas jurisdiction
from the judiciary: "Except as provided in section I 005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ... an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of
an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
69
548 U.S. 557, 575-76 (2006)(The Court took the preliminary step of finding that the DTA and CSRTs did not
strip the judiciary of the power to hear habeas petitions and that abstention was not necessary in the present case).
70
I d. at 590-635 (In a lengthy opinion, the Court first found that the military commissions set up by the Bush
Administration were not authorized by either the DTA, AUMF, or the UCMJ. It then proceeded to find that the
military commissions themselves violated the UCMJ and the Geneva Convention).
71
Military Commissions Act of2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
72
I d. § 948b ("PURPOSE. -This chapter establishes procedures governing the use of military commissions to try
alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and
other offenses triable by military commission.").
73
Id. § 950j ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and notwithstanding any other provision oflaw ... no
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of action whatsoever, including
any action pending on or filed after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, relating to
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In 2008, Boumediene challenged the constitutionality of the statute.

74

In a five-member

majority ruling the Court, for the third time, struck down an attempt to withdraw habeas review
from the judiciary. Specifically, the Court found that the CSRTs did not provide a sufficient
alternative to habeas proceedings, that Congress's jurisdiction-stripping effort violated the
Suspension Clause and that absent a wholesale suspension of the writ neither the President nor
Congress could carve out an exception as it pertained to individuals detained at Guantanamo

Whereas Rasul, Hamdan and Boumediene dealt with the access to habeas review
concerning non-citizens, the Supreme Court has also had occasion to consider the procedural
rights due an American citizen designated an "enemy combatant" by the Executive. In Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld/6 a plurality of the Court agreed with the Executive on the substantive issue of whether
it could lawfully detain enemy combatants without preferring criminal charges. However, the
Court went on to find that, procedurally, the decision to detain Hamdi indefinitely was
deficient. 77 Applying the procedural due process test promulgated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 78 the
Court determined that Hamdi was entitled to, "notice of the factual basis for his classification,
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safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.").
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and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker." 79
Taken as a whole, this series of Supreme Court decisions represent a substantial
weakening of the unlimited emergency powers that the Executive has enjoyed throughout
American history. It is clear that suspected terrorists, citizen and non-citizen alike, are entitled to
both the substantive and procedural safeguards of the Constitution. Because of the amorphous
and seemingly indeterminate nature of the war on terror, this ongoing conflict between the
Judicial Branch and the Executive and Legislative Branches represents a significant impediment
to the efficient and effective waging of the war.
The American approach has traditionally sought to deal with emergencies within the
general framework of the Constitution, despite its ambiguous language and unclear allocation of
emergency powers. The result has been that throughout separate eras power has been exercised
and rights have been affected in an inconsistent manner. A second approach for dealing with
emergencies relating to terrorism, particularly within the United Kingdom and Israel, has been ad
hoc legislative mechanisms that address what are determined to be ongoing threats of terrorism.
The following section addresses whether such a system would be better suited to confront the
terrorist threat.

B. Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom
Many of the emergency laws enacted in the United Kingdom prior to 2001 dealt with the
conflict in Northern Ireland, as opposed to any threat from international terrorism. The most
significant of these was the 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA). 80 Passed
in response to shootings and bombings committed by both Unionist and Loyalist forces in
79

80

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, (N.Ir.).
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Northern Ireland, the Act removed the right to trial by jury for a number of serious offenses,
including murder, bombings and armed robbery. 81 The EPA also granted the police broad powers
to arrest those suspected of being part of a terrorist organization and to perform warrantless
searches. 82 Furthermore, membership in a proscribed terrorist organization, defined as "the use
of violence for political ends", became a criminal offense. 83
As Irish Republican Army (IRA) activity spread to England, Scotland and Wales,
Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1974. 84 Whereas the EPA covered
only Northern Ireland, the PTA was in effect throughout the United Kingdom. The PTA allowed
the police to detain persons for up to seven days without judicial approval and the Secretary of
State to remove individuals from the United Kingdom. 85 Although the PTA was also used
against international terrorists, the overwhehning majority of those it was used against were
lrish. 86 For a quarter century the majority of terrorism laws passed in the United Kingdom
concerned the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland. However, in 2000, Parliament passed the
Terrorism Act, which provided an extended list of proscribed terrorist organizations, including
those beyond association with Northern Ireland. 87
The Terrorism Act was short lived, and in response to the September 11th attacks the
United Kingdom passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act. 88 The matters covered by
the act include the seizure of terrorist property, new police powers, and the detention of
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/d. §2 ("A trial on indictment of a scheduled offense shall be conducted by the court without a jury."); See id. sch.
27 for list of schedule offenses.
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/d. §§10-18.
83
Id. §19, 28.
84
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, (U.K.).
85
Id. §5, 7
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See Susan Breau, Stephen Livingstone & Rory O'Connel~ Anti-Terrorism Law and Human Rights in the United
Kingdom, HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, QUEENS UNIVERSITY BELFAST, p.2 (last visited Dec. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.britishcouncil.org/china-society-pub1ications-911.pdf.
87
Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, (U.K.).
88
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, (U.K.) (hereinafter ACS Act).
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suspected international terrorists. 89 Specifically, the act reintroduced internment without trial into
United Kingdom law, allowing the Home Secretary to detain a non-national suspected of being
an international terrorist so long as he reasonably believes the individual to be a threat to national
security and to order a person's removal from the country. 90
Under the Act an individual who wished to challenge his detention was unable to do so in
ordinary courts. The Act provided that the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)
was to hear any challenge to an individual's detention and could reverse the Home Secretary's
decision if it were found there were no reasonable grounds for detention. 91 The SIAC does not
operate under ordinary court rules and the Commission may hear secret evidence against the
detainee in the absence of the detainee or his legal representative. Although, the Act did allow an
individual to appeal SIAC decisions to the Court of Appeals. 92
In response to certain provisions of the 2001 Act being invalidated by the House of
Lords, Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. 93 The invalidated provisions
concerned the detention of non-nationals and were ruled by the Honse of Lords to be a violation
of both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act of 1998. 94 The
2005 Act established the "control order", a form of house arrest, as a lesser restrictive means of
monitoring individuals suspected of terrorist ties than those provided for by the 2001 Act. 95
Despite being a lesser restrictive means of protecting the public from a terrorist act, the "control
orders" are significantly constrictive of the individual's liberty rights, including limits on the
89
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1502 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales), available at
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III).
95
PTA, 2005, c. 2, §§ 1-9.
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person's employment, associations or communications with certain individuals, freedom of
movemt;llt and electronic tagging. 96

.r

The powers granted under the 2005 Act were quickly supplemented following the July
2005 bombings of the London Subway when Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2006. 97 In
addition to modifying existing offences, the Act introduces new offenses such as encouragement
of terrorism or dissemination of terrorist publications. 98 The Act also extended the period of
detention for those suspected ofterrorism. 99 During debate in the House of Commons, a ninetyday detention period before being charged was proposed, representing a significant extension of
the fourteen days that were currently allowed under existing legislation. However, the
amendment was defeated and the period of detention was only extended to twenty-eight days,
double what was previously allowed. 100
As shown above, the United Kingdom has a robust statutory framework for preventative
detention in addition to a broad definition of what constitutes terrorism and the criminal
sanctions attached to their violation. Because the European Convention on Human Rights binds
the United Kingdom there has been a more concerted effort by the United Kingdom to deal with
the threat of terrorism within a criminal justice framework. 101 Despite efforts to bring individuals
to trial where possible, there is still a large margin of discretion granted to Parliament regarding
legislative acts that implicate fundamental rights. The post-2000 Acts significantly increased
police powers when combatting terrorism, and, moreover, the procedures applied to detention
hearings lack the protections commensurate with a traditional criminal proceeding. While
ld.
Terrorism Act, 2006, c. II, (U.K.).
98 ld. § 1.
99
I d.§ 23.
100
Matthew Tempest, Blair defeated on terror bill, THE GUARDIAN (November 9, 2005), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/nov/09/uksecurity.terrorism.
101
See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.) ("An act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under
the European Convention on Human Rights.").
96
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judicial bodies have provided a legitimate check on legislative overreaching, there are still
important fundamental rights that are restricted by the struggle between liberty and security in
the United Kingdom.

C. Emergency Powers in Israel

Focus on the state of Israel is especially relevant concerning the war on terrorism. Israel
has been in a constant state of emergency since it's founding and, as such, has a large body of
law concerning explicit emergency powers. Because the nature of the war on terrorism appears
increasingly indefinite the lessons learned from the Israeli experience can provide a case study
for whether or not explicit emergency provisions are wise and the considerable chance that they
may be used to violate human rights both in the international and domestic spheres.
The authority to determine when an emergency exists in Israel is provided by the Basic
Law: The Government.

102

That authority is explicitly granted to the Knesset, the Israeli

legislative body. 103 Despite the Basic Law stating that a declared emergency may not exceed one
year, it provides that the Knesset as necessary may renew the emergency. 104 Therefore, the
Knesset has consistently renewed the state of emergency since 1948. The Basic law also
provides that should the Prime Minister determine it is impossible to convene the Knesset, he
.
. .
may m ake emergency reguIatlons
or empower a Illlllister
to make them. 105

Israel's emergency laws are divided into three main categories: Defence (Emergency)
Regulations, administrative orders, and formal emergency Laws. The first of these, Defence
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(Emergency) Regulations, are a holdover from the British Mandate of Palestine. 106 The original
aim of these laws was to suppress Palestinian and Jewish insurgency during the period from
193 7-1945. 107 Despite being the law of a colonial power, the Modem State oflsrael incorporated
the Defence (Emergency) Regulations into their own law due to the state's establishment during
a time of war. 108 As a result, the power to enforce the Defence (Emergency) Regulations belongs
to military authorities. These include the power to arrest, inspections, and the ability to open and
close roads and businesses. 109 The regulations also allow for the military to suppress movement
and speech. 110
Despite being termed emergency laws, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations are not
dependent on a declared state of emergency, nor are they restricted to any time limit. 111
Furthermore, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations grant vast power to the military authorities.
In addition to the powers that can have a significant affect on the daily lives of Israelis and

Palestinians, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations have also been used to expropriate Arab
lands and to try civilians by military tribunal. 112 Despite multiple attempts to repeal the Defence
-----fl',IIWFgency) Regulations legislation has repeatedly stalled in the Knesset. 113 However, the
Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, passed by the Knesset in 1979, did manage to repeal the
provisions of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations concerning administrative detention. 114
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Administrative emergency orders are the second form of Israeli emergency laws and are
considered original Israeli law, in that they were not inherited from the colonial power. 115
Generally, administrative emergency orders delegate legislative authority to government
ministers. These orders differentiate from the Defence (Emergency) Regulations in only a few,
but significant, respects. First, administrative emergency orders are dependent on a declared state
of emergency. Second, emergency orders must be in accordance with "the defense of the State,
public security and the maintenance of supplies and essential services." 116 However, such
language poses no significant constraint on the authority of the Knesset to pass such orders,
given that the objectives are so broad. These types of orders have commonly been used as part of
a broad administrative detention regime in both the West Bank and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories. 117
Administrative detention in the West Bank is currently carried out under an
administrative order.li 8 The Order grants military commanders in the West Bank the power
detain a person for up to six months, so long as they have reasonable grounds to believe that "a
certain person must be held in detention for reasons to do with regional security or public
security" .119 The military commanders, at their own discretion, may extend the detention order
for an additional period of up to six months. 120 However, the order fails to specify a maximum
period in which an individual can be administratively detained.
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Whereas the Defence (Emergency) Regulations were silent on the issue of judicial
review, the administrative detention order provides that individuals who are detained are entitled
to challenge their detention. 121 According to the order, within eight days from the day the person
is detained, the individual must be brought before a military judge to determine if the detention is
justified. 122 The military judge may approve the order, cancel it, or shorten the duration. 123
Deviation from the criminal rules of evidence are allowed during hearings and either the detainee
or the military commander may also appeal the military court's decision to the Military Court of
Appeals. 124
Despite the comprehensive and broad authority encompassed by the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations and administrative emergency orders, there is still a third category of
Israeli emergency laws. The Knesset formally enacts this class of laws in their capacity as the
legislative authority in Israel.

125

Many formal emergency laws begin as administrative

emergency orders, limited to three-month periods and intended to be temporary. 126 However,
when renewed by the Knesset they become formal laws, part of the Israeli statutory
framework. 127
Formal emergency laws provide the Israeli government with an additional tool for
detaimnent of suspected terrorists. The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law was enacted, in
1979, to replace the provisions regarding administrative detention in the Defence (Emergency)
Regulations.

128

In contrast to the administrative detention order, the Emergency Powers

(Detention) Law applies to residents of Israel, resident of the occupied territories, and foreign
121
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nationals. 129 Despite the broader application of these laws, the detainee is entitled to review of
their confmement before the President of the District Court where they are detained. 130 The
review must take place within three months of the detainment and the President may set aside the
detention order if he believes it was not made for reasons of state security or public security or if
it was made in bad faith or for irrelevant considerations. 131
In response to the first and second intifadas, the Knesset passed another set of formal
laws, further convoluting the legal framework governing detention. Entitled the Internment of
Unlawful Combatants Law, the purpose of this law is to regulate the detainment of civilians who
carry out hostilities against Israel and are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status under
international humanitarian law. 132 The Law enables the detention of individuals for an unlimited
period of time if the chief of staff, or an officer holding the rank of major-general or above,
believes that their release will harm state security. 133
Similar to the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, the Unlawful Combatants Law
stipulates that judicial review is to be held before a District Court judge once every six
months. 134 However, it differs in a significant respect. The Law provides that during the judicial
proceedings the state can rely on two legal presumptions: 1) release of the detainee will harm
state security, and 2) the determination of the Minister of Defense that the organization the
detainee is a part of is perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel. 135
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As shown above, the Israeli system for handling emergencies is extremely convoluted.
There is a large amount of overlap between the Regulations, Administrative Orders, and Laws.
Furthermore, there is both an official and unofficial hierarchy between the laws. While some
require a declared state of emergency, others are in operation at all times. It is also unclear which
law may have supremacy given a conflict between relevant provisions. However, the more
disconcerting development has been the asymmetrical manner in which the law has been applied.
The Defence (Emergency) Regulations have frequently been used to expropriate Palestinian
lands in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 136 Moreover, administrative detention has been
used extensively and disproportionately against Palestinians. 137 The result has been that, rather
than a set of laws applicable only to emergency situations, the emergency regime has become a
governing tool. 138
In 2008, the Israeli Supreme Court had the occasion to address the constitutionality of the
Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. 139 The case dealt with two residents of the Gaza Strip
who were being held by Israel as alleged members ofHezbollah and, as the individuals claimed,
in violation of their right under the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. 140 In ruling that the
Law was constitutional the Court applied section eight of the statute: "There shall be no violation
of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted
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for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required." 141 This test is known as the
principle of proportionality.

III.

Due Process Balancing v. the Principle of Proportionality

A. The Need for a Legal Framework Regarding Targeted Killings

During the war on terror, each attempt by the Executive to withdraw habeas review from
the courts has resulted in a strong rebuke from the Supreme Court. Given that the war on terror
appears to be indefinite in duration, the United States must clearly address what powers the
President has to limit constitutional rights while combatting terrorism rather than continuing to
address the matter with multiple legislative acts followed by judicial determinations that the
President has exceeded his authority. Because the Supreme Court is unlikely to be able to uphold
the targeted killing program under due process analysis it may be better suited by applying the
principle of proportionality to American terrorism cases moving forward.
As part of his opinion dismiss the al-Aulaqi case, the district court judge cited the political
question doctrine, implying that the decision to place Mr. al-Aulaqi on a targeted kill list
constituted a nonjusticiable political question.
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In doing so, the judge expressed an

unwillingness to question the Executive's decision to take military action in addition to a
reluctance to involve the courts in foreign policy-making. 143 However, the issue before the court
was not whether it would be prudent to question the military and foreign policy decision of the
Executive branch but whether the Executive branch has the authority to unilaterally deprive a
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U.S. citizen of his life absent due process. 144 As stated by the President of the Israeli Supreme
Court, Aharon Barak: "Judicial review does not examine the wisdom of the decision to engage in
military activity. In exercising judicial review, we examine the legality of the military
activity." 145
The decisions regarding the Guantanamo detainees were fraught with political implications.
Despite this fact, the Supreme Court found judicially manageable standards by which to
adjudicate the plaintiff's claims. This reflects the Court's determination that:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 146
In dismissing the complaint, albeit on standing grounds, the district court left al-Aulaqi's
constitutional rights wholly un-vindicated. 147 Assuming the question eventually comes before the
Supreme Court, the issue of whether or not the Executive can unilaterally deprive a citizen of
their procedural and substantive rights absent process will have to be addressed. This would
involve both the Matthews v. Eldridge 148 test for procedural due process and strict scrutiny
review regarding the fundamental right to life. Given the courts previous decision in terrorism
cases, it is difficult to foresee the Executive program surviving this type of review.
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B. The Principle ofProportionality
Whereas the Supreme Court has consistently rejected acts of Executive unilateralism that
deprive individuals of their fundamental rights throughout the war on terror, courts in the United
Kingdom and Israel have, through the principle or proportionality, developed a more flexible
approach to matters concerning the constitutional implications of the conflict. The principle of
proportionality is a three-step process of judicial review. The first subtest examines whether
there is a rational connection between the objective and means used to achieve it. The second
subtest examines whether the objective could be achieved through less intrusive means. The third
subtest examines whether the injury caused is in proportion to the benefit achieved.
I. United Kingdom
It is important to first distinguish the United Kingdom from the United States and Israel
with regards to the legal regime under which they are operating. The United Kingdom is a
signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which has domestic legal
effect pursuant to the Human Rights Act of 1998. 149 As a matter of judicial review this has little
to no effect. Both the European Court of Human Rights and courts in the United Kingdom apply
the principal of proportionality concerning fundamental rights. However, the rights guaranteed in
the ECHR are significantly more specific than those guaranteed by the American Constitution in
addition to being broader in scope. 150
In McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, 151 the European Court of Human Rights
applied the both the second and third subtests of the principle of proportionality, less intrusive
149
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means and proportionality in the narrow sense, regarding the targeted killing of three Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) agents in Gibraltar. The claim in McCann had been that the
soldiers, in killing the PIRA agents, had acted in contravention of Article 2 of the ECHR. 152 In
addressing whether Article 2 had been violated the court looked to whether the actions of the
soldiers where in fact proportionate and to whether the planning and organization of the
operation made lethal action necessary. 153
The court applied the customary international law rule of self-defense in determining
whether the actions of the soldiers met the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. 154 In doing
so, they found that the decision of the soldiers to take lethal action was proportional to the
objective achieved: "The Court accepts that the soldiers honestly believed, in the light of the
information that they had been given, as set out above, that it was necessary to shoot the suspects
in order to prevent them from detonating a bomb and causing serious loss oflife." 155
However, the court went on to find that the control and organization of the operation as a
whole violated Article 2. 156 Because the United Kingdom had previous knowledge of the plan to
attack and had failed to detain the PIRA agents upon their entry to Gibraltar, the court found that
lethal action had been rendered inevitable. 157 Despite the Government assertion that if they had
detained the agents at the border there would not have been sufficient evidence to detain and try
the individuals, the court was "not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the
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use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary." 158 Therefore, the killings violated
the second subtest of proportionality.
The principle of proportionality has also been used to determine the constitutionality of
the Government's program of detaining suspected terrorists. InA(FC) and Others v. Secretary of

State for the Home Department, 159 foreign nationals had been detained under the 200 I Antiterrorism, Crime, and Security Act. The foreign nationals had challenged their detainment in
relation to the first and second subtests for proportionality. While conceding that the prevention
of a terrorist attack was a sufficiently important o~ective when limiting fundamental rights, they
challenged whether the legislation was rationally related to the objective and whether there were
substantially less restrictive measure that could achieve the objective. 160
The House of Lords agreed with the appellants on both these points, thus invalidating
section 21 and 23 of the Act. 161 These sections allowed for the certification and detention of a
foreign national, but did not provide similar mechanisms for U.K. nationals. Reasoning that U.K.
nationals were just as capable of committing terrorist acts as foreign nationals, the House of
Lords found that the objective of the sections was not rationally related to the prevention of
terrorism. 162 Moreover, the court pointed to examples of less restrictive measures already
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[2004] UKHL 56, [2002] EWCA Civ 1502 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales), available at
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employed against one of the appellants. 163 Consequently, the sections also failed to impair the
individual's freedom no more than necessary to accomplish the objective. 164
2. Israel
The Israeli Supreme Court has applied the principle of proportionality test to a wide array
of cases, including those dealing with the fence separating Israel proper from the occupied
territories, the internment of individuals suspected of being a member of a terrorist organization
and targeted killings. Because of the circumstances Israel finds itself in, the judiciary allows for a
"margin of constitutional appreciation" concerning legislative acts that implicate fundamental
rights. 165 Although this margin of appreciation gives the Knesset significant discretion when the
choice is between fundamental rights and security, it is not a presumption that the legislative act
in question is constitutional. The Court's decisions reflect this understanding that the test of
proportionality is a flexible test, involving assessment and evaluation and dependent on the
circumstances of each case.
In Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel,
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the High Court of Justice

determined whether the military's assessment of the ideal route for a separation fence in the
occupied territories violated the right of property and freedom of movement of those affected.
The military had claimed that the location of the proposed separation fence was necessary for
them to effectively prevent attacks originating in the Palestinian territory. 167 Meanwhile, the
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parties were in disagreement regarding the impact the fence would have on the livelihood of the
Palestinians affected, although it was admittedly significant. 168
The Court quickly dispensed with the first two elements of the proportionality test,
finding that there was a rational connection between the objective of the fence and the proposed
route and that there was no alternate route that would fulfill security needs while causing lesser
injury. 169 The decisive factor for the Court was whether the injury to the local inhabitants was
proportionate to the benefit of the security fence. 170 In holding that it was not, the Court found
that the difference between the proposed route and an alternate route that was less harmful to the
inhabitants was minimal. 171 Measured against the significant injury perpetrated against the
inhabitants affected, the result was disproportionate. 172
Whereas the individuals whose fundamental rights were affected in Beit Sourik were
farmers and other victims of the ongoing conflict in Israel, the appellants in A and B v. State of
/srae/ 173 did not necessarily have clean hands. Appellants had been detained under the

Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law as alleged members of the Hezbollah group. 174 They
challenged their detention under both international humanitarian law and the Israeli Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty. 175 After focusing on the issue of the detainee's designation as
uulaw:ful combatants, the Court then addressed their constitutional rights.
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As in Beit Sourik, the Court quickly found that the frrst subtest of proportionality, a
rational connection to the objective, had been satisfied. 176 However, the Court engaged in a more
detailed analysis of the second subtest. Appellants argued that for the realization of the
legislative purpose of the Law, detention as an unlawful combatant was not necessary or that
alternatively, they should be given a criminal trial. 177 The Court rejected this argument, stating
that the purpose of the law was not to punish for past acts but rather to prevent future acts that
threaten the security of the State. 178 Moreover, the Court found that detention under the
Internment Law, rather than the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, was proper given the
different purposes served by each law. 179 In addition, the Court also rejected appellants
argument that the circumstances of their detention were an excessive violation of their liberty
rights, and thus out of proportion to the benefit achieved by their detainment. 180 Therefore, all
three subtests of proportionality had been satisfied and the Court declared their detainment
constitutional.
The Israeli High Court of Justice has also applied the principle of proportionality while
addressing the issue of targeted killings. In Public Committee Against Torture v. Government, 181
the Court engaged in an in-depth analysis of whether targeted killings, specifically those where
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collateral damage may be a consequence of the attack, satisfY proportionality in the narrow
sense, the third subtest. In addressing the third subtest the court held that there must be due
proportion between the advantage and the damaged caused by the targeted killing:
The test of proportionality stipulates that an attack on innocent
civilians is not permitted if the collateral damage to them is not
commensurate with the military advantage (in protecting
combatants and civilians). In other words, the attack is
proportionate if the advantage arising from achieving the proper
military objective is commensurate with the damage caused by it to
innocent civilians. This is an ethical test. It is based on a balance
between conflicting values and interests. 182

Based on this reasoning, the court held that every targeting killing is not prohibited "ab initio",
that every targeted killing must satisfY proportionality in the narrow sense and that any harm
done to civilians must be not only be outweighed by the benefit achieved but also limited to the
greatest extent possible. 183
As is evident from the Israeli Supreme Court's decisions, the test of proportionality
allows for a significant amount of discretion with regards to legislative and military decisions.
However, it is not simply a rubber stamp. Given the ongoing threat of terrorism that Israel faces
the principle of proportionality provides a flexible approach that varies depending on factspecific circumstances and the magnitude of the security interests at stake. This allows the Court
to balance liberty and security interests appropriately, free from the rigorous application of a
tiered system of review that can all but predetermine the outcome of a given conflict between
interests.
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CONCLUSION

There can be little doubt that Anwar al-Aulaqi was a threat to American security. He was
an admitted jihadist and, although the evidence linking him directly to terrorist attacks has not
been made public, the influence Mr. al-Aulaqi wielded within the English-speaking jihadist
community is clear. Three of the post-9/11 attacks have cited al-Aulaqi as inspiration. However,
the contention that citizens such as al-Aulaqi, Mr. Kahn, and Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi are entitled
to "due process, not judicial process" is troubling. Because of the Obama Administration's
unwillingness to disclose the procedures for determining how an individual is placed on a "kill
list", let alone admit such a program exists, there is a legal vacuum concerning targeted killing.
At the onset of the war on terror the Bush administration attempted to create a legal black
hole at Guantanamo. At every step their attempts were rebuffed by a Supreme Court intent on
upholding the Constitution, even during the struggle against terrorism. Still, the Supreme Court
has not been unreasonable, finding that the process due suspected terrorists need not be on scale
with the protections provided in the criminal setting. Due to the logistical difficulties in
physically detaining individuals such as al-Aulaqi it is unlikely that they well find it necessary
that the Obama Administration entitle these individuals to Article III trials or even military
commissions. 184 Nevertheless, the current reginle is increasingly untenable.
Most of the legal questions concerning the war on terror weigh liberty interests, generally
protected as constitutional rights, against security interests that constitute a collective social
good. The use of a proportionality test is not completely foreign to the Supreme Court as it has

184
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applied such a test when competing constitutional interests are weighed. 185 The reality may be
that the conflict between a citizen's constitutional rights and the collective social benefit of being
free from terrorism is, "not a context in which a court should effectively presume either
constitutionality (as in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality (as in strict scrutiny)." 186
At issue with the targeted killing of American citizens is the Executive's authority to
deprive individuals of their substantive and procedural due process rights. These rights represent
a significant and fundamental constitutional question and it is difficult to foresee the Supreme
Court being able to uphold the most serious deprivation of rights, life, absent any process
whatsoever. Because it is unlikely that the Executive program can survive the procedural due
process test or strict scrutiny review there is a vacuum in the legal framework regarding the
targeted killings of Americans. Since the issue is so complex, implicating both constitutional and
international law concerns, a more flexible approach may be necessary. The principle of
proportionality can provide such an approach.
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